This week our concern is how we “pack the world into words.” Bruno Latour’s Chapter on soil sampling in the Amazon illustrates the many steps that one must take in formulating scientific conclusions and theories. Only after performing a series of preparations, calibrations, tests, and analyses is one able to conclude a “study.” Latour shows us that making reference is not pointing to ‘x’ and saying “this is the answer,” making reference is a process in which knowledge is transformed. In the context of this chapter, I think that the ability to transform knowledge is enhanced by involvement of scientists from various professional and social backgrounds, each of whom brings his/her own expertise to the table to influence what is known.
Another theme in this chapter is that of “mobilization.” Scientists mobilize the world into the realm of science by engaging the public through texts and articles. The doing of science is made possible by mobilizing nature (samples) into the laboratory. Conversely, science can also be mobilized into nature. Latour states of the field site, “I thought I was deep in the forest, but the implication of this sign ‘234,’ is that we are in a laboratory, albeit a minimalist one, traced by the grid of coordinates” (32). On thing that interests me about mobilization is that it seems to be, in and of itself, a time of great transformation. Plant samples are brought to the laboratory for analysis, but they are taken out of context of the forest; they represent only a moment in time; they’re dried to kill the fungi and insects that are a part of the referent...though irrelevant to the “matter” at hand. However, when samples from different points in time are recombined and compared to one another, they are transformed again to tell an entirely new story, one of time and change. As Latour puts it, “in losing the forest, we win knowledge of it” (38).
Circulating reference is just this. It is the pattern of giving form to matter again and again until your research question has been sufficiently addressed. Putting the world into words is a process of making reference. But, as we discussed in class, reference is a string whose credibility relies upon its traceability. The string must withstand the unwinding that occurs when one looks at the process of the forming up of matter, and this string must also be able to wind itself up once again. As studies relevant to this same subject matter are performed, the string undergoes this process of reversal, and if it proves to be credible, it is reinforced by additional credible studies, forming a rope. If it is not credible, it must be unwound to the point of error and attempted once more.
Credible knowledge can only be achieved through the use of careful field and lab methods. If one does not properly locate, record, sample, and measure the matter that is being studied, the form of the study itself is compromised. Articulating the properties of matter and imposing qualitative categories depends on the use of tools to measure samples. Latour shows us that the information gained through this process, gives data a stability that transcends time. Once we know that the properties of ‘x‘ are ‘1’ and ‘2’, we can communicate this information to the world outside of the Amazon. This is how science is mobilized. But of course, I always have to give my two cents about the importance of expressing the methods that are used in the field. Anyone and everyone can put the world into words. Without articulating one’s methods, the world is incapable of scientifically and/or intellectually determining if this is the edition which they would like to read, internalize, and accept as truth.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Saturday, April 17, 2010
Literature and the Laboratory - Michelle Sumovich
Chapters 1 and 2 of Bruno Latour’s Science in Action focus on the elements of science-in-the-making, which occur in the laboratory and then through literature which describes the scientists’ findings. Latour begins with an explanation of the article-writing and claim-making process, prior to his account of the “doing” of science, perhaps because article-reading is relatively more familiar to the average layman. However, despite the familiarity of the article format, the levels of discourse and chaos that exists in the production of science literature is surprising.
Latour discusses modalities as the foundation for how a claim is made, modalities being the varied presentations of ideas in literature. It is an intriguing thought that the shape of an argument can be formed by the passiveness or aggressiveness of presentation and by a simple choice of words. Latour states that “it is around modalities that we will find the fiercest disputes since this is where the behaviour of other people will be shaped” (p 25). Collins (2009) may say that this expresses the inevitability of human influence in science. To some degree, I think that modalities are a function of biases being expressed discretely (and perhaps unintentionally) and subsequently, they provoke the expression of the readers’ own biases about how things are presented. In this sense, Latour suggests that science authors can make or break their position right out of the gate because our opinions and biases are larger than the scientific matter at hand. But to what extent can modality be controlled for, and should it be?
This chapter also makes us realize a degree of vulnerability experienced by scientists who rely on the reference of previous (credible) work, the acceptance of the upstream (and perhaps downstream) community, and the success of this work as expressed by its citation within well-founded articles in the future. To curb this “hostile environment,” Latour offers positioning tactics such as stacking, staging, framing, and captation to guide the success of one’s argument. Here he encourages science authors to be courageous with their logic...but not too courageous; to leave their readers free to discuss the claim, while subtly controlling the objectors‘ criticisms. In order to stay afloat, the author must find a balance between positive and negative modalities which makes his article neither too passive nor aggressive for certain audiences. However, as addressed in our class discussions and readings about framing, this process runs the risk of compromising the context of and data from the original study. The larger a controversy grows, the greater the risk of the data becoming misused and removed from its original intention. The differential use of “internal virtues,” as discussed by Kosso, show us how study 1 can be used to support study 2 against author 1’s intentions. I fear that an over-emphasis on positioning exaggerates non-scientific elements of a paper, and may subsequently make it more vulnerable to the manipulation of contrasting virtues which enable author 2 to “change” a study without ever taking it back into the laboratory.
But fortunately Latour does take us into the laboratory to discuss the tests and methods which produce the data, graphs, and theories that are expressed through literature. He states that once in the lab, it is much more difficult for the dissenter to challenge a claim because here they can see the “proof” with their own eyes. But on the other hand, one must examine the credibility of “proof” as it is expressed either through actual instrument readings and measurements or through the conclusions drawn from them. Moreover, one must consider the accuracy of the readings and measurements that are being used. Latour says that it is at this juncture, that one must decide to give up, accept the findings, or recreate the study for himself to measure his results against the current claim.
From Kosso we see that asking for the justification of claims is a necessity, because science is only trust-worthy to the degree that it can justify how nature and the world actually work. His focus as a philosopher of science is on how we approach “the unobservable” to answer questions about these phenomena with whatever fragmentary evidence we do have. Here we replace claims and counter-claims with theories and counter-theories, giving a new and very abstract meaning to ideas of “proof,” “accuracy,” and “credibility.” However, as should be the case with claims, formidable conclusions can only be drawn through the doing of experiments. It seems that in the world of theory, credibility is achieved through the diminishment of hypotheticals.
An important point of these two chapters is that “facts” very rarely ever speak for themselves. If they did, then where would controversy arise? In its purest sense, discourse must evolve from a natural variation of methodologies and personal interpretations of data, from positive and negative modalities, and (un)realized personal biases. In an impure sense, perhaps this type of discourse is born out of explicit “interpretations” of data driven by special interests and personal ethics. I am not so skeptical as to assume that the latter is the norm. However, Latour does make it clear that the longevity of one’s study depends on objectivity and a sufficient amount of support, again conjuring images of being courageous but not too courageous; sensational but not over-sensational. In this sense it becomes somewhat understandable how one may struggle in an internal battle to achieve both credibility and longevity.
Latour discusses modalities as the foundation for how a claim is made, modalities being the varied presentations of ideas in literature. It is an intriguing thought that the shape of an argument can be formed by the passiveness or aggressiveness of presentation and by a simple choice of words. Latour states that “it is around modalities that we will find the fiercest disputes since this is where the behaviour of other people will be shaped” (p 25). Collins (2009) may say that this expresses the inevitability of human influence in science. To some degree, I think that modalities are a function of biases being expressed discretely (and perhaps unintentionally) and subsequently, they provoke the expression of the readers’ own biases about how things are presented. In this sense, Latour suggests that science authors can make or break their position right out of the gate because our opinions and biases are larger than the scientific matter at hand. But to what extent can modality be controlled for, and should it be?
This chapter also makes us realize a degree of vulnerability experienced by scientists who rely on the reference of previous (credible) work, the acceptance of the upstream (and perhaps downstream) community, and the success of this work as expressed by its citation within well-founded articles in the future. To curb this “hostile environment,” Latour offers positioning tactics such as stacking, staging, framing, and captation to guide the success of one’s argument. Here he encourages science authors to be courageous with their logic...but not too courageous; to leave their readers free to discuss the claim, while subtly controlling the objectors‘ criticisms. In order to stay afloat, the author must find a balance between positive and negative modalities which makes his article neither too passive nor aggressive for certain audiences. However, as addressed in our class discussions and readings about framing, this process runs the risk of compromising the context of and data from the original study. The larger a controversy grows, the greater the risk of the data becoming misused and removed from its original intention. The differential use of “internal virtues,” as discussed by Kosso, show us how study 1 can be used to support study 2 against author 1’s intentions. I fear that an over-emphasis on positioning exaggerates non-scientific elements of a paper, and may subsequently make it more vulnerable to the manipulation of contrasting virtues which enable author 2 to “change” a study without ever taking it back into the laboratory.
But fortunately Latour does take us into the laboratory to discuss the tests and methods which produce the data, graphs, and theories that are expressed through literature. He states that once in the lab, it is much more difficult for the dissenter to challenge a claim because here they can see the “proof” with their own eyes. But on the other hand, one must examine the credibility of “proof” as it is expressed either through actual instrument readings and measurements or through the conclusions drawn from them. Moreover, one must consider the accuracy of the readings and measurements that are being used. Latour says that it is at this juncture, that one must decide to give up, accept the findings, or recreate the study for himself to measure his results against the current claim.
From Kosso we see that asking for the justification of claims is a necessity, because science is only trust-worthy to the degree that it can justify how nature and the world actually work. His focus as a philosopher of science is on how we approach “the unobservable” to answer questions about these phenomena with whatever fragmentary evidence we do have. Here we replace claims and counter-claims with theories and counter-theories, giving a new and very abstract meaning to ideas of “proof,” “accuracy,” and “credibility.” However, as should be the case with claims, formidable conclusions can only be drawn through the doing of experiments. It seems that in the world of theory, credibility is achieved through the diminishment of hypotheticals.
An important point of these two chapters is that “facts” very rarely ever speak for themselves. If they did, then where would controversy arise? In its purest sense, discourse must evolve from a natural variation of methodologies and personal interpretations of data, from positive and negative modalities, and (un)realized personal biases. In an impure sense, perhaps this type of discourse is born out of explicit “interpretations” of data driven by special interests and personal ethics. I am not so skeptical as to assume that the latter is the norm. However, Latour does make it clear that the longevity of one’s study depends on objectivity and a sufficient amount of support, again conjuring images of being courageous but not too courageous; sensational but not over-sensational. In this sense it becomes somewhat understandable how one may struggle in an internal battle to achieve both credibility and longevity.
Monday, April 5, 2010
The Intersection of Science and Politics - Michelle Sumovich
This week’s readings focus on how to address the relationship that exists among science, society, policy, and politics. As Nisbet and Mooney (2007) note, a lack of understanding about the technical complexities of science often impedes public interpretation. Laypeople without a strong scientific foundation to support the accumulation of new data typically seek out media sources that, in turn, support their established personal values and beliefs. To put it plainly, Nisbet and Scheufele (2007) state that “ignorance is at the root of conflict over science,” and that scientific messages should be framed in various ways to engage diverse audiences. My feeling is that, while framing undoubtedly piques the interests of a larger segment of the population, it clearly presents a risk of perpetuating debate and confusion, and rallying for the sake of winning support. While the act of framing is intended to maintain the content of the original scientific study while applying the findings to different social concerns, the ability to adversely manipulate the context of the study is varied and great.
However, I do agree with Nisbet and Scheufele’s argument that the facts cannot speak for themselves, and that communicating scientific messages to the public is urgent, lest other, non-qualified special interest groups interpret the data first. If framing is, in fact, the most effective means of engaging a larger public, I believe that conflict and debate should take a backseat to factuality and limitations. This is not a statement of skepticism about the ability of the sciences, but one that hopes to address Collins’ (2009) call to unite the first and second waves of science studies. I feel that there is truth to both convictions; that although science should be conducted and communicated without bias, “science cannot avoid human influence.” Collins suggests that while “first wave science” may be the ideal, the skepticism of the second wave cannot be forgotten. I feel that in part this is due to the underlying realization that if one fails to express his biases or ethical convictions, the result will be an inflated representation of his opposition. In this sense, political controversy has science-based policy at a stand-still.
An emphasis on policy perspective over political perspective, as noted by Pielke, could allow for a public shift in focus from discourse and debate to constructive scientific guidance. To me, policy perspective represents an ethical means of engaging the public without steering nor enforcing personal or political biases. If the goal to “enhance freedom of choice” is met, while presenting facts relevant to science and the social sciences, the public may walk away having learned something, whereas limiting the scope of the study too narrowly only reinforces what the reader already knows (or wants to know). I believe that achieving this requires honesty on behalf of the scientific community about what is known and what is unknown; what has been accomplished and what are the limitations. Collins states “scientists can guide us only by admitting their weaknesses.” An outstanding example of this in my own studies is PSU archaeologist Virginia Butler, who advocates for an explicit revelation of methodology and limitations, so readers of varied degrees of experience can piece the study together and determine for themselves how sound or unsound they find it. If the goal is to give the public a range of alternatives to stimulate decision-making, granting readers a clear picture of the known and unknown within a study may eliminate the chances of knowledge falling out of context.
However, I do agree with Nisbet and Scheufele’s argument that the facts cannot speak for themselves, and that communicating scientific messages to the public is urgent, lest other, non-qualified special interest groups interpret the data first. If framing is, in fact, the most effective means of engaging a larger public, I believe that conflict and debate should take a backseat to factuality and limitations. This is not a statement of skepticism about the ability of the sciences, but one that hopes to address Collins’ (2009) call to unite the first and second waves of science studies. I feel that there is truth to both convictions; that although science should be conducted and communicated without bias, “science cannot avoid human influence.” Collins suggests that while “first wave science” may be the ideal, the skepticism of the second wave cannot be forgotten. I feel that in part this is due to the underlying realization that if one fails to express his biases or ethical convictions, the result will be an inflated representation of his opposition. In this sense, political controversy has science-based policy at a stand-still.
An emphasis on policy perspective over political perspective, as noted by Pielke, could allow for a public shift in focus from discourse and debate to constructive scientific guidance. To me, policy perspective represents an ethical means of engaging the public without steering nor enforcing personal or political biases. If the goal to “enhance freedom of choice” is met, while presenting facts relevant to science and the social sciences, the public may walk away having learned something, whereas limiting the scope of the study too narrowly only reinforces what the reader already knows (or wants to know). I believe that achieving this requires honesty on behalf of the scientific community about what is known and what is unknown; what has been accomplished and what are the limitations. Collins states “scientists can guide us only by admitting their weaknesses.” An outstanding example of this in my own studies is PSU archaeologist Virginia Butler, who advocates for an explicit revelation of methodology and limitations, so readers of varied degrees of experience can piece the study together and determine for themselves how sound or unsound they find it. If the goal is to give the public a range of alternatives to stimulate decision-making, granting readers a clear picture of the known and unknown within a study may eliminate the chances of knowledge falling out of context.
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